Needlestick injury

Introduction

Needlestick and sharps injuries account for 17 per cent of accidents to NHS staff and are the second most common cause of injury, behind moving and handling at 18 per cent.

The major blood-borne pathogens of concern associated with needlestick injury are:

- hepatitis B virus (HBV)
- hepatitis C virus (HCV)
- human immunodeficiency virus (HIV).

However, other infectious agents also have the potential for transmission through needlestick injury. These include:

- human T lymphotrophic retroviruses (HTLV I & II)
- hepatitis D virus (HDV or delta agent, which is activated in the presence of HBV) hepatitis G virus (GB virus or GBV-C)
- cytomegalovirus (CMV)
- Epstein Barr Virus (EBV)
- parvovirus B19
- transfusion-transmitted virus (TTV)
- West Nile Virus (WNV)
- malarial parasites
- prion agents such as those associated with transmissible spongiform encephalopathies (TSE).

In the United Kingdom (UK), the Health Protection Agency Centre for Infections (HPA CfI) monitors significant occupational exposures and potential transmission of HIV, HCV and HBV from patients to healthcare workers through a national surveillance scheme. Data are reported in the Eye of the Needle report, which is regularly updated and can be accessed at www.hpa.org.uk/infections

When a blood or body fluid exposure incident occurs in the context of an ‘exposure-prone procedure’, the possibility of transmission of infection from healthcare worker to patient must be considered, as well as from patient to healthcare worker.

‘Exposure-prone procedures’ are those where there is a risk that injury to the healthcare worker could result in the patient’s blood or open body tissue being exposed to the blood of the healthcare worker. In practice these include surgery, midwifery, dentistry and physical contact with trauma patients who may have open fractures or glass-contaminated wounds.

Needlestick or sharps injuries occur when a needle or other sharp instrument accidentally penetrates the skin. This is called a percutaneous injury. If the needle or sharp instrument is contaminated with blood or other body fluid, there is the potential for transmission of infection, and when this occurs in a work context, the term occupational exposure (to blood, body fluid or blood-borne infection) is used.

When blood or other body fluid splashes into the eyes, nose or mouth or onto broken skin, the exposure is said to be mucocutaneous.
The risk of transmission of infection is lower for mucocutaneous exposure than for percutaneous exposures. Other potential routes of exposure to blood or other body fluids include bites and scratches.

The National Audit Office (NAO) report of April 2003, *A safer place to work – improving the management of health and safety risks to staff in NHS trusts*, and the subsequent Public Accounts Committee hearing, highlighted the need for the better management of needlestick and sharps incidents in the NHS.

- At least four UK healthcare workers are known to have died following occupationally-acquired HIV infection. By 2005, another healthcare worker was known to have been infected.
- Between 1996 and 2010, the Health Protection Agency received reports of fifteen healthcare workers who had been infected with hepatitis C virus due to occupational exposure.

Available data suggests that the number of reported occupational exposure incidents increased by 49 per cent between 2002 and 2005, according to the HPA. However, many of these incidents could have been avoided by adopting precautions and by disposing of clinical waste appropriately.1

This chapter gives guidance on what NHS employers should do to reduce the risks of needlestick and sharps injuries to staff.

**Employer responsibilities**

Employers are responsible for assessing risk and preventing exposure to biological hazards, or reducing the risks of exposure as far as possible. They should do the following:

- formal risk assessment
- risk management, including work design and safer working practices
- effective and regular training
- provide medical devices incorporating safety-engineered protection mechanisms.

With 40,000 reported incidents each year (and at least as many unreported), needlesticks and sharps injuries are a significant issue affecting NHS staff health, safety and welfare. They should be managed as part of a trust’s integrated risk management policy.

**The legal position**

The Health and Safety at Work etc Act 1974 places a legal duty on employers to provide for the health and safety of their employees. NHS trusts have been subject to the full requirements of this legislation since 1991.

These duties were extended under the Management of Health and Safety at Work Regulations 1999, which require employers to:

- assess risks to the health and safety of their employees
- arrange for implementing a comprehensive system of safety management.

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1 *Eye of the Needle* (2010), HPA
By failing to prevent needlestick injuries, trusts can be found to be in breach of health and safety regulations, and many have settled such cases, resulting in substantial legal expenses and compensation payments.


Under the Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations 1995 (RIDDOR), exposures to hepatitis B or C, or HIV, are reportable to the HSE as a dangerous occurrence (‘accidental release of a biological agent likely to cause severe human illness’) using form F2508, rather than as an injury (unless the exposure results in three or more days absence from work). Reports can be made online at www.riddor.gov.uk.

Under the Health Act (2006), the Government published a new and specific Code of Practice for the prevention and control of healthcare-associated infection, which requires NHS bodies to implement policies that encompass "the provision of medical devices incorporating sharps protection mechanisms."

It places a new statutory duty on NHS healthcare organisations to make arrangements to put the provisions of the Code into practice, backed up by action if there are significant failings in relation to the Code.

In a legal ruling against the Scottish Ambulance Service in 2004, three appeal judges ruled that cost grounds alone cannot be a reason not to purchase safer sharps devices, as this breached European health and safety laws.

Managing the risks

One of the major problems associated with the management of needlestick incidents, identified by the NAO in its report and confirmed by the HSE, is the lack of hard evidence relating to the actual numbers of incidents in trusts. This is due to the under-reporting of exposure incidents, which some studies have identified as being as high as 85 per cent. The NAO identified data collection and record keeping, together with the monitoring of those records, as a key area that requires more work.

All exposure incidents should be reported promptly, following local reporting arrangements (usually to the trust’s occupational health service). This is important for three reasons:

- it ensures appropriate management to reduce the risk of blood-borne virus transmission
- it documents the incident and the circumstances, which is essential for the subsequent investigation of occupational injury or infection
- it provides accurate surveillance, so that collective data analysis can inform measures to reduce the risk of further exposures.
Surveillance systems

All cases of occupational exposure to blood or body fluid from patients infected with HIV, hepatitis C virus or hepatitis B virus, and all incidents where post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) for HIV has been started (whatever the HIV status of the source), should be reported to the Health Protection Agency national surveillance scheme.

The anonymity of the healthcare worker is maintained through unique identifier codes.

The scheme aims to record:

- the numbers of healthcare workers being exposed to these viruses
- the circumstances contributing to occupational exposures
- the clinical management of those exposures, including HIV exposures and the use of PEP
- the side effects and outcomes.

Further information about the scheme can be found at www.hpa.org.uk/infections

Trusts interested in devising a format for collecting their data comprehensively might wish to refer to the Safer Needles Network (www.needlestickforum.net) or to one of the health service unions, who all have experience in this area.

A national study was established on the prevalence and causes of needlestick and sharps injuries, using the EPINet™ surveillance system. This is an international computerised database for recording data about needlestick injuries and body fluid exposure. Further information about this system can be found at www.med.virginia.edu.

Assessing the risk

Risk assessments should be made of all situations where a healthcare worker may be exposed to blood or other potentially infectious material. This will:

- identify how exposure could be eliminated
- allow consideration of possible alternative systems
- eliminate the unnecessary use of sharps by implementing changes in practice and providing medical devices incorporating safety-engineered protection mechanisms.

Independent studies show that a combination of training, safer working practices and the use of medical devices incorporating sharps protection mechanisms can prevent more than 80 per cent of needlestick and sharps injuries.²

Prevention of blood exposure incidents

Every effort should be made to avoid blood and body fluid exposures occurring, through safe systems of work.

In 2003, the National Institute for Health and Clinical Excellence published guidelines for the Prevention of Healthcare Associated Infections in Primary and Community Care. Recommendation SP (Standard Principle) 24 states:

“Needle Safety Devices must be used where there are clear indications that they will provide safer systems of working for healthcare personnel.”

The guidelines acknowledge that safety devices not only minimise the risk of operator injury but also reduce ‘downstream’ injuries following the disposal of sharps, involving housekeeping or portering staff.

The Care Quality Commission (CQC) operates under a new law regulating health and adult social care in England. From 1 October 2010, every health and adult social care service in England is legally responsible for making sure it meets new essential standards of quality and safety. The CQC will register, and therefore license, care services if they meet essential standards and will monitor them to make sure they continue to do so. It has a wide range of actions it can take if it finds care services are not meeting essential standards, which includes keeping patients and staff safe.

The Care Quality Commission assesses NHS Trusts’ performance against the provisions laid out in the Code of Practice for the Prevention and Control of Health Care Associated Infections. The Code specifically addresses the need to prevent exposures to blood-borne viruses including prevention of sharps injuries. It states that measures to avoid exposure to blood-borne viruses should include:

- immunisation against hepatitis B
- the wearing of gloves and other protective clothing, the safe handling and disposal of sharps, including the provision of medical devices incorporating sharps protection, and measures to reduce risks during surgical procedures.

The principle of following Standard (Universal) Precautions means never assuming that there is no risk. If every patient is assumed to be potentially infected with a blood-borne infection, the same precautions to prevent exposure should be used for every procedure.

Needles should never be re-sheathed. Re-sheathing needles is a common cause of needlestick injury. The ink mark on an index finger or thumb after inaccurate re-capping of a pen illustrates how easily re-sheathing needlestick injuries occur. Re-capping of needlesticks has been banned in the EU.

Cuts and grazes should be covered with waterproof dressings. Non-intact skin is a potential route of entry for blood-borne transmissible agents through contact with infected body fluids.

Personal protective equipment should be worn when dealing with blood or body fluids.

**Gloves**

Although a needle or sharp instrument can easily penetrate a glove, the risk of transmission of infection is significantly reduced. The glove material will remove up to 86 per cent of the blood on the outside of a needle. An inner glove will

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remove most of blood not removed by the outer glove. Double gloving therefore substantially reduces the risk of blood-borne virus transmission from a sharps injury.

**Eye protection**

This is important wherever blood or other body fluids could splash into the eye. Ordinary prescription spectacles offer some, but inadequate, protection, as they are not generally designed for this purpose. Eye protection should therefore be worn routinely not just in operating theatres, delivery suites and endoscopy suites, but also in accident and emergency departments and any other clinical areas where pressure may lead to spurting or splashing of body fluids, such as when unblocking or irrigating lines and tubes.

Blood may become aerosolised due to surgical drilling techniques, such as those used in orthopaedic surgery, and mucous membrane exposure may not always be recognised.

There are many designs of safety spectacles now available, many of which will fit over prescription lenses and frames.

**Sharps handling and disposal**

Studies in the United States and Europe have shown significant reductions in the numbers of needlestick injuries from improving sharps disposal.

Sharps should never be passed hand to hand and handling should be kept to a minimum. All sharps should be disposed of carefully at the point of use. This means that suitable sharps containers (conforming to British Standard BS 7320) should be portable enough to take to the site of a procedure, and designed specifically to allow needles and sharp instruments to be disposed of easily and safely at the point of use. It is not acceptable, particularly for cost reasons, to reduce the number of sharps bins to such an extent that staff are forced to carry used needles to the sharps bin to dispose of them.

This should also reduce the number of incidents resulting from incorrect disposal or non-disposal of sharps, for example in clinical waste bags, bed linen and laundry, or on floors and other surfaces.

Ideally sharps bins should be designed to prevent overfilling and accidental spillage of contents. They should be easy to close temporarily and permanently, and there should be no risk of puncture of the container. Cardboard sharps bins should not be used. Care is needed to ensure portable sharps bins are not left unattended in areas where non-healthcare workers (especially children) can access them.

Syringes/cartridges should be disposed of intact.

In the pressurised work environment of healthcare, staff may be tempted to take short cuts, to save time. This can increase the risk of needlestick injury. It is important that healthcare workers receive continuously updated education and training about safe systems of work with sharps and body fluids. This will ensure that safety becomes embedded into organisational culture and that safe working practices become second nature.

Staff require regular specific training in this key area, not just at induction.

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4 Safe use and disposal of sharps (2001), Medical Devices Agency
Medical devices incorporating sharps prevention mechanisms

Many medical devices incorporating sharps prevention mechanisms are now available. These are designed to significantly reduce or eliminate the risk of needlestick injury. They include safety-shielded and retractable needles, safety lancets, blunt needles (for example for suturing), needle-free systems, blunt plastic cannulae and shielded cannulae.

There is a large range of diverse products available, so it is essential to select the most appropriate product for a particular clinical procedure. It is important that devices are evaluated locally by relevant stakeholders.

The following areas should be considered as part of the selection process:

- fitness for purpose
- user acceptability
- safety and training requirements
- supply
- collection
- delivery
- price
- cleaning and sterilisation.

There is a growing body of independent evidence from Europe and beyond regarding the effectiveness of these devices.\(^5\)\(^6\)

Independent European academic studies have investigated the issue of cost effectiveness of medical devices incorporating sharps protection mechanisms. These studies explore the overall costs of managing needlestick injuries and assess the cost of purchasing devices incorporating sharps protection mechanisms against the overall financial benefits of reducing injuries. They conclude that investments to prevent needlestick injuries will achieve overall economic savings.

Training

Trusts should include specific time within training programmes and at induction for all staff to cover:

- the risks associated with blood and body fluid exposures
- preventive measures including standard precautions, safe systems of work and the importance of hepatitis B immunisation
- the correct use and disposal of sharps

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\(^6\) Occurrence and prevention of reported occupational needlestick injuries within NHS Scotland, with particular reference to the role of safety devices (2004), Scottish Centre for Infection and Environmental Health
the correct use of medical devices incorporating sharps protection mechanisms.

Refresher training should be made available on a regular basis.

Management of blood and body fluid exposure incidents

First aid treatment

- If the mouth or eyes are involved, they should be washed thoroughly with water.
- If skin is punctured, free bleeding should be gently encouraged and the wound should be washed with soap or chlorhexidine and water, but not scrubbed or sucked.
- If there is any possibility of HIV exposure, urgent advice should be sought about the relative indications for anti-retroviral post-exposure prophylaxis.

Unfortunately, under-reporting of exposure incidents is widespread. Every effort should be made to encourage and facilitate local reporting. The reporting process should be easily accessible, straightforward and confidential. Depending on local arrangements, body fluid exposures in a healthcare setting may be managed by a number of different departments including occupational health, accident and emergency, infection control, infectious diseases, genitourinary medicine, sexual health, HIV services, microbiology or virology. 

Assessment of the risk of blood-borne virus (BBV) transmission

Average estimated seroconversion risks from published studies and reports are:

- 0.3 per cent for percutaneous exposure to HIV-infected blood
- 0.1 per cent for mucocutaneous exposure to HIV-infected blood
- 0.5-1.8 per cent for percutaneous exposure to HCV-infected blood with detectable RNA
- 30 per cent for percutaneous exposure of a non-immune individual to HBeAg positive source.

Factors that may increase the risk, and influence management of the incident are:

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9 Ramsay ME. Guidance on the investigation and management of occupational exposure to hepatitis C (1999), Commun Dis Public Health; 2 258-62

10 Jagger J. Puro V. De Carli G. ‘Occupational transmission of hepatitis C virus’ (2002), JAMA; 288(12): 1469-71
• percutaneous injury rather than mucous membrane or broken skin exposure
• injury with a device from a source patient’s artery or vein
• blood exposure rather than exposure to blood-stained fluid, diluted blood (for example in local anaesthetic solution) or other body fluid
• injury from hollow bore rather than solid bore needle
• injury from wide gauge rather than narrow gauge needle
• deep rather than superficial injury\(^{11}\)
• visible blood on the device
• no protective equipment used (like gloves, double gloves, eye protection)
• first aid measures not implemented (washing, bleeding)
• HCV RNA detectable in source patient on most recent blood test
• high viral load of HIV in source patient\(^{12}\)
• HBeAg detectable in source patient blood
• exposed person not or inadequately immunised against hepatitis B
• source patient co-infected with more than one BBV.

When a body fluid exposure occurs and is reported, the first priority is to assess how likely it is that the incident will result in blood-borne virus transmission, and then take steps to reduce that risk as far as possible. The initial assessment and management has to be based on the information available at the time.

Relevant information to consider

The source patient

1. Known or unknown?

2. If unknown, is there any indication of the origin of the device or body fluid? For example, was the device from a unit or area with patients known to have hepatitis B or C or HIV?

3. If known, is the source patient known to be infected with hepatitis B, hepatitis C or HIV? The validity of negative results varies depending on how long ago the tests were done and current risks factors.

4. If the source patient is not known to carry any of these infections, do they have any risk factors for them?

5. The risk of being infected with HIV is increased in people from areas of high prevalence, particularly sub-Saharan Africa, men who have sex with men (MSM), intravenous drug users, people with HIV-infected mothers or with HIV-infected sexual partners.


6. The risk of being infected with hepatitis C is increased by receipt of unscreened blood or untreated plasma products (in the UK prior to September 1991 and 1985 respectively); sharing of injecting equipment while misusing drugs; sharps injury or mucous membrane splash exposure to blood from patients known to be infected, or at risk of infection with hepatitis C; involvement as a healthcare worker or a patient in invasive medical, surgical, dental or midwifery procedures in parts of the world where infection control precautions may have been inadequate; or with populations with a high prevalence of hepatitis C infection (like Egypt).

7. The risk of being infected with hepatitis B is increased in intravenous drug users, men who have sex with men (MSM), and in people with hepatitis B-infected mothers or hepatitis B-infected sexual partners.

8. If the source patient is known to be infected with HCV, is HCV RNA detectable on most recent test?

9. If the source patient is known to be infected with HIV:
   • has there been a recent/current seroconversion illness?
   • are they terminally ill with HIV-related disease? If so viral load may be high.
   • what is the most recently recorded viral load?
   • are they taking anti-retroviral drugs?
   • is there any evidence of viral drug resistance?

10. If the source patient is known to be infected with hepatitis B, are they:
    • HBsAg positive?
    • HBeAg positive?

The exposed person

Hepatitis B immune status:
• unvaccinated?
• one, two, three or more doses of hepatitis B vaccine?
• date of last booster?
• most recent HBsAb result and date?
• HBcAb positive (natural immunity)?

Protocol for management of exposures

In all cases:

1. A blood sample from the exposed person should be sent to a virology or microbiology laboratory for serum to be saved and stored. There is no point in testing this sample for blood-borne viruses at this stage, unless there is reason to believe the exposed person may already be infected. The purpose of this sample is to be able to show that, in the unlikely event of subsequent seroconversion, the member of staff was not infected at the time of the exposure, and therefore the infection was occupationally acquired. As occupational acquisition of blood-borne virus infection is fortunately rare, in the majority of cases this sample is never tested.

2. The exposed person should be given time to talk about their concerns following the incident and discuss the available information about risks from the exposure.

Counselling of the exposed person should include information about:
• statistics regarding seroconversion risks
• risks involved in this particular incident
• steps to reduce the risk of BBV transmission
• follow-up procedure and rationale behind it
• ‘window period’ if the source patient has ongoing risk factors for BBV infection
• infection control precautions (e.g., safe sex) and no blood donation during follow-up period, but no additional work restrictions
• establishing support networks: friends, family and so on
• allowing time to express anxieties and concerns and to answer questions
• HIV and HCV follow-up tests (and HBV if not immune)
• confidentiality

3. Follow-up to confirm that occupational blood-borne virus transmission has not occurred. See Figure 1 on p12.

**Approaching source patients for blood-borne virus testing**

It can be very helpful to test source patients, with their informed consent, for HIV, HBV and HCV, regardless of risk factors, unless very recent results are available. Most source patients consent to testing when the policy is explained.

Pre-test discussion for HIV antibody testing should be considered part of mainstream clinical care, and should therefore not require specialist counselling training or qualification. (*HIV testing for patients attending general medical services: national guidelines. Royal College of Physicians, March 2005.*)

**Checklist for pre-test discussion with source patient**

1. The pre-test discussion should be carried out with due sensitivity, and not by the exposed member of staff.

2. Explain what has happened and the policy for requesting consent for BBV testing. Check understanding of the tests, which are the same as those done for blood donors. Explain confidentiality. The approach is not made on the basis of perceived risk and patients can decline permission for testing.

3. Details of the exposed person should be kept confidential.

4. Discuss the practical implications of the test and its result (positive or negative), for example sexual relationships, work situations, medical follow-up and life insurance (The Association of British Insurers recommends that companies should only ask about positive test results). Remember the potential stigma associated with HIV in many communities.

5. Discuss possible routes of transmission of HIV, HBV and HCV. If high-risk behaviour occurred within the preceding three months (they don’t have to say what) explain the ‘window period’ (six–ten weeks from infection to the detection of measurable antibodies). Consider organising a follow-up test after the window period.

6. Describe the procedure for having blood taken. Discuss arrangements for communicating the results to the source patient.
7. Informed consent may be obtained verbally or in writing.
8. Request HBsAg, HCV antibody and HIV antibody test on the pathology form.
9. Write ‘source patient in needlestick incident’ for clinical details.
10. Occasionally a patient is unable to give consent. Consent cannot be given by a third party like a next of kin. It may now be illegal to test without consent, depending on interpretation of the Human Tissue Act 2004. If the patient refuses consent, if it would be detrimental for the patient to be approached, or there are any other reasons why the testing is not done, this should be recorded and the exposed person informed.

Figure 1

Management of body fluid exposure incidents

- Post Exposure Prophylaxis
- Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurrence Regulations 1995 (Health and Safety Executive)

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13 Human Tissue Act 2004
Managing exposures from unknown sources

What should be done about an injury from a used needle of unknown source? The principle for any needlestick injury is to assess the risk of blood-borne virus transmission, and then aim to minimise that risk as far as possible. It’s important to keep this principle in mind, as it’s easy to get lost in the detail when confronted with a scenario that is often accompanied by a measure of anxiety.

Systematic assessment of the risk from any incident involves consideration of three categories of information: the circumstances of the exposure, the source of the exposure and the exposed individual.

About the circumstances of the exposure, it is important to establish whether exposure has indeed occurred. Was the skin actually breached by the needle? There is no evidence to suggest that blood-borne viruses can be transmitted across intact skin, or from a needle that has not been used. Deep injury from a large, hollow bore needle with visible, fresh blood will carry a higher risk than one from a superficial scratch from an old, blunt, solid or subcutaneous small needle through protective clothing. First aid measures such as washing and bleeding the wound (but not scrubbing or sucking it) will help to minimise the risk.

Some like to consider an estimate of the approximate statistical risk of transmission and are reassured by this, while others find statistics baffling and distressing. Published studies have calculated from reported cases, the average risk of transmission from a source known to be infected. Combining this with the risk of the source being infected (for example the background population prevalence of infection, or the prevalence in intravenous drug users if that seems the likely source of the needle) makes the overall likely risk relatively small. The HPA website is a useful source of up to date epidemiological data.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>UK Population Prevalence*</th>
<th>Prevalence in UK IVDUs *</th>
<th>Average seroconversion risk after percutaneous exposure to known infected source</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HIV 0.08%</td>
<td>London 3% Elsewhere 0.5%</td>
<td>0.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HCV 0.4-0.5%</td>
<td>41%</td>
<td>0.5-1.8% (if detectable RNA)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>HBV 0.5% HBsAg carriers</td>
<td>22%</td>
<td>30% (non-immune individual exposed to HBeAg positive source)</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Source: HPA

Unless there are clues about the possible origin of the needle (for example, found in the surgery waiting room after a diabetic clinic), a discarded needle may well have been used to inject illicit intravenous drugs. However, blood in the bore of the needle is probably diluted with injection material, and viral load should diminish as it dries. Blood on the outside of the needle is likely to have been wiped by contact with grass, soil, clothing and so on. All this reduces the likely risk of HIV transmission from a needle of unknown source to no more than 1 in 30,000. This does not justify the risks of post-exposure prophylaxis with anti-retrovirals in most cases. Although HIV is often the greatest fear, in fact hepatitis C and hepatitis B are more common and more transmissible. Hepatitis C seroconversion has been documented following injury from a needle in a hospital waste bag. However, hepatitis C transmission is unlikely in the absence of detectable HCV RNA, and similarly many chronically-infected hepatitis B carriers are also of low infectivity.
If the source patient is infected with HIV

In the case of definite exposures to blood or other high-risk body fluids known or considered to be at high risk of HIV infection, post-exposure prophylaxis (PEP) should be offered as soon as possible, preferably within one hour of the incident.

It may still be worth considering up to 72 hours after the exposure, but the relative benefit of prophylaxis diminishes with time.

The current standard recommended regimen for PEP is a 28-day course of:

- **Truvada (Tenofovir disoproxil 245mg/Emtricitabine 200mg)** one tablet twice a day
- **Kaletra (Lopinavir200mg/Ritonavir50mg)** 2 tablets bd

Anti-emetics such as metaclopramide, domperidone, cyclizine, ondansetron, and anti-motility drugs, such as loperamide, are often co-prescribed for the side effects.

Anti-retroviral drugs are not licensed for PEP, so must be prescribed on a ‘named patient’ basis by a doctor. The regimen may need to be modified if there is evidence that the source patient is infected with a virus that is resistant to any of these drugs. In this case, specialist advice should be sought from the HIV physician treating the source patient.

Anti-retroviral drugs have side effects including: nausea, vomiting, abdominal pain, lethargy, fatigue, diarrhoea, headache, bone-marrow suppression, rashes, liver-function disturbance, pancreatitis, peripheral neuropathy, glucose intolerance (protease inhibitors) and renal calculi.

The exposed person may have relative contraindications to consider, like pregnancy, breast feeding, a history of anaemia, neutropenia, hepatic or renal failure. There are many possible drug interactions to be considered, so check carefully with available information from a specialist pharmacist about any potential interactions with medications the exposed person may be taking.

Exposed persons should be counselled about the side effects and the potential risks and benefits of PEP, so that staff can make an informed choice whether to take PEP or not. Expert advice may be required. In some cases it may be appropriate to approach the source patient for urgent out-of-hours HIV testing if there are relative contraindications to PEP.

If there is doubt and anxiety, it may be reasonable for the exposed person to take the first dose of PEP (unless there are contraindications). This takes away the need for an urgent decision and allows time for further consideration.

In view of the recommendation to start PEP as soon as possible, starter packs containing enough drugs for 5 days (to cover weekends and public holidays) should be made available to avoid delay due to dispensing a prescription. However, the cost-benefit balance will need to be carefully considered. The drugs are expensive and starter packs must be checked regularly to ensure expiry dates are not exceeded.

The exposed person should be followed up weekly while taking PEP for:

- repeat prescriptions for the drugs
- psychological support

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• blood samples:
  – biochemistry (urea and electrolytes)
  – liver function tests (including gamma GT and amylase)
  – haematology (full blood count)

• monitoring of side effects.

The exposed person should return for testing (with informed consent) for HIV antibodies at three months after completing post-exposure prophylaxis.

If the exposed person tests positive for HIV antibodies, it will be necessary to test the stored baseline sample and refer them to a specialist in HIV medicine. See Figure 2 on page 16.
Figure 2: Management of HIV Exposures

**HIV Post-Exposure Prophylaxis**

**High Risk Exposure Incident:**
- Needlestick/scratch
- Body fluid on **broken** skin
- Body fluid on mucous membrane (eye, nose, mouth)

**High Risk Body Fluid:**
- Blood
- Amniotic fluid
- Human breast milk
- CSF, pleural, pericardial peritoneal synovial fluid
- Saliva associated with dentistry
- Semen/vaginal secretions
- Unfixed tissues/organs
- Vomit, faeces, urine **only when contaminated with blood**

**High Risk Source:**
- Known HIV positive
- Consider also those at risk of HIV:
  - Those from endemic areas (South, East or Central Africa)
  - Sex between Men
  - Multiple blood transfusions <Oct 1985
  - Transfusions abroad
  - IV Drug user
  - Unprotected sex with HIV+ or at risk partner

**Contraindications to PEP:**
- Drug interactions:
  - Amiodarone, ergot derivatives
  - St John's Wort
  - rifampicin
- Anaemia/neutropenia, hepatic/renal failure
- Pregnancy/breast feeding

**Starter pack contains:**
- **Truvada** (Tenofovir disoproxil 245mg/Emtricitabine 200mg) **one tablet twice a day**
- **Kaletra** (Lopinavir200mg/Ritonavir50mg): **2 tablets bd**
- Domperidone for nausea and Loperamide to counteract diarrhoea
- All sufficient for 5 days

**Follow up weekly for side effects and haematology and biochemistry including liver function tests, amylase and glucose, and 3 months post cessation of PEP for anti-HIV test**
If the source patient is infected with HCV

There is no prophylaxis available for hepatitis C. Blood should be taken and serum sent for saving and storage. Transmission is unlikely from HCV RNA negative sources.

The exposed person should return for blood tests for:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Table 1: Summary of follow-up blood tests for staff member exposed to HCV:</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HCV Antibodies</td>
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<tr>
<td>----------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baseline</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 weeks</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 months</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 months</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

If the source patient is infected with HBV

If the exposed person is not immune to hepatitis B, the patient’s HBsAg status should be requested urgently. (See Table 2 for management of exposures according to immune status of exposed person and HBV status of source of exposure). Follow-up blood testing will only be necessary if the exposed person was non-immune at the time of the incident. Test for HBsAg at:

• six weeks
• three months
• six months
• and save serum at the time of the incident.

See Table 2 on page 19.

If the source patient is unknown or testing cannot be done

These cases are considered on an individual basis. As much detail about the exposure as possible should be obtained.

There will usually be no follow-up other than the initial serum save and check for HBV immunity (if required) for the exposed person, unless there are particular reasons for concern (for example, a patient strongly suspected to be infected with a blood-borne virus).

If the exposed person is very anxious, follow-up testing for HIV, HCV and HBV (if not immune) may help alleviate their anxiety. Hepatitis C PCR testing is not appropriate in these circumstances.

If blood test results are given over the telephone, it will be necessary to first confirm identity and ensure confidentiality is maintained.
Preventing further incidents

Consideration of the circumstances of individual exposures should prompt further investigation of working practice and/or equipment with a view to minimising the risk of future incidents.

More information

Guidance on managing blood and body-fluid exposure incidents can be found in these publications:


HIV testing for patients attending general medical services: national guidelines (2005), Royal College of Physicians.

HIV Post-Exposure Prophylaxis: Guidance from the UK Chief Medical Officers’ Expert Advisory Group on AIDS (2004), Department of Health. (This guidance has been under review and the updated version can be accessed at www.advisorybodies.dh.gov.uk or www.dh.gov.uk)

Table 2
Management of HBV exposures

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Significant exposure</th>
<th>Non-significant exposure</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>HBV status of person exposed</td>
<td>HBsAg positive source</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt;1 dose HB vaccine pre-exposure</td>
<td>Accelerated course of HB vaccine HBIGx1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&gt;2 doses HB vaccine pre-exposure (anti-HBs not known)</td>
<td>One dose of HB vaccine followed by second dose one month later</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known responder to HB vaccine (anti-HBs &gt; 10mIU/ml)</td>
<td>Booster dose of HB vaccine</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Known non-responder to HB vaccine (anti-HBs ≤ 10mIU/ml 2-4 months post vaccination)</td>
<td>HBIGx1 consider booster dose of HB vaccine</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NB HBIG = Hepatitis B immunoglobulin

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